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Warsaw Convention: Treaty Under Pressure
Jay Levine*
T HE MAJOR UNITED STATES and foreign airlines have agreed' to ab-
solute liability for provable damages up to $75,000 for injury or
death of passengers on Warsaw Convention 2 flights to, from, or stop-
ping in, the United States. For the vast majority of Americans on
international flights, the Agreement disposes of the Convention's li-
ability limit of $8,300.3 And the Lisi opinion 4 of the Second Circuit may
make the Convention a dead letter for accidents occurring before the
Agreement.
Strains in the Warsaw Convention
Drafted in 1929, the protection of a foundling airline industry was a
primary objective of the Convention. But the fostering of international
air commerce also required some inducement to travelers. The Con-
vention reconciled competing considerations:
a. by creating a presumption of carrier liability; 5
b. by making it very diffcult to rebut the presumption (to do so,
the carrier must show that it had taken all necessary measures
to avoid the damage or that it was impossible to have done so); 6
c. by limiting this presumptive liability to $8,300; 7
d. by voiding any contractual lowering of this limit," and
e. by imposing a burden on the claimant to prove wilful misconduct
to recover in excess of the limit.9
At the Hague in 1955, twenty-six countries signed an amendatory
Protocol1 ° to the Convention. The United States participated in the con-
ference but did not sign the Protocol until 1956. The Protocol doubled
the liability limit to $16,600,11 fostered the illusion that recoveries in
* Practising Law Institute (New York City), Education Publications Editor; member
of the New York Bar.
1 Agreement C. A. B. 18900; C. A. B. Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
2 49 Stat. 3000, T. S. 876 (1934).
3 Id., Article 22(1).
4 Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, Docket Nos. 30543-4-5-6-7, 2d Cir., Dec. 16,
1966, 9 CCH Av. L. Rep. § 18,374, affirming 253 F. Supp. 237 (S. D. N. Y. 1966), pe-
tition for rehearing in banc filed Dec. 29, 1966.
5 Warsaw Convention, Article 17, supra, n. 2.
6 Ibid., Art. 20 (1), supra, n. 2.
7 Id., Art. 22 (1), supra, n. 2.
8 Id., Art. 23, supra, n. 2.
9 Id., Art. 25, supra, n. 2.
10 The text of the Protocol may be found in 2 CCH Av. L. Rep. §§ 27, 101-128.
11 Hague Protocol, Article XI, supra, n. 10.
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the United States might go as high as $25,000,12 and endorsed a rigid
interpretation of wilful misconduct.13 The Protocol came into force,
among those countries that ratified it, on August 1, 1963.
We have never ratified the Protocol. Our desire for a higher limit
had been a major reason for invoking the conference at the Hague, and
our representatives had urged a figure higher than that settled upon. The
Administration was irresolute in presenting the Protocol to the Senate
and recommended ratification only if coupled with federal legislation
providing for automatic compulsory insurance of an additional $50,000
for each passenger.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was even less impressed
by the Protocol. It recommended that if the insurance legislation did
not pass the Congress by the time of adjournment in 1965, the State
Department should withdraw from the Warsaw Convention.
Congress did not act on the compulsory insurance legislation in
1965. The State Department, threatening denunciation of the Conven-
tion, tried to persuade the U. S. lines voluntarily to increase their limits
to $100,000. They would not do so. With more brass than the carriers
expected, the State Department then denounced the Convention on
November 15, 1965.14 In accordance with the Convention's provision
for denunciation,15 ours was to be effective in six months, on May 15,
1966.
The International Civil Aviation Organization, an intergovern-
mental body, convened in Montreal in February, 1966 to respond to our
action. Our representatives opted for amendment of the Warsaw limit
to $100,000 but no figure could be settled upon. Indeed, views on an
appropriate limit and on the sufficiency of data upon which to make a
decision were so disparate that the conference left little hope of early
amendment to the Convention.
On the failure of the ICAO conference, the Director General of
the International Air Transport Association, an organization of U. S.
and foreign carriers engaged in international transport, undertook what
12 Id. The Protocol would have permitted a local court to add counsel fees to an
award if that were local practice. There was no requirement to do so. Addition of
counsel fees is not local practice in the United States in negligence cases.
13 Hague Protocol, Article XIV, supra, n. 10. The Protocol would have permitted
unlimited liability on a showing that the pilot or other agent acted with intent to
cause damage or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result.
This was essentially the instruction on wilful misconduct in the Jane Froman case.
Froman v. Pan American Airways, 284 App. Div. 935, 135 N. Y. S. 2d 619 (1954),
leave to appeal denied, 308 N. Y. 1050, cert. denied, 349 U. S. 947 (1955). The vitality
of this rather strict definition was reaffirmed in Berner v. British Commonwealth
Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 346 F. 2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U. S. 816 (1965).
14 The Polish Foreign Ministry is the official depository of the Convention. Warsaw
Convention, Articles 36-39, supra, n. 2. Our denunciation was effected by a note
filed with the Ministry by our Ambassador in Warsaw. The text of the note is in
Dept. of State Press Release No. 268, 15 Nov. 1965, reprinted at 31 J. Air L. & Com.
303 (1965).
15 Warsaw Convention, Article 39, supra, n. 2.
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WARSAW CONVENTION: TREATY
could not theretofore be accomplished. By the middle of May, 1966,
IATA had secured the consent of 11 U. S. and 17 foreign carriers, and
the assurances of others, to an agreement sufficient to warrant the State
Department's withdrawal of our denunciation of the Convention. On
May 14, 1966, one day before the denunciation would have been ef-
fective, we withdrew it.' s , 17
Vitamin Therapy
The Agreement' s builds upon the scope of the Convention, which
scope depends on the places listed on the passenger ticket.1 9 The Con-
vention applies if the place of departure or a place of destination are air-
ports within two countries that adhere to the Convention, 20 even if
there is a stop within a non-adherent or if the ticket provides for further
transit on to a non-adherent. This further transit may be on another
carrier. The Convention also applies to a round trip ticket for passage
from an adherent, to a non-adherent, and back again. 21 It would not
apply to a round trip starting in a non-adherent, going directly to an
adherent and also returning non-stop to the non-adherent.
The Agreement applies to transportation within the scope of the
Convention in which a point in the United States is an agreed starting
point, termination point or stopping point. A host of flight arrangements
involving the Convention and the Agreement may be summarized as
follows:
a. An entire flight ticketed between the United States and another
Warsaw adherent, with either as the point of origin or destina-
tion, even with stops in a non-adherent.
b. An entire flight ticketed to include the United States and another
Warsaw adherent as a segment of the flight, even if the ticket
points start from, and/or continue on to, a non-adherent to War-
saw.
c. A round trip ticket from the United States to and from a non-
adherent (but not a round trip from the non-adherent, to the
United States, and back again).
16 Withdrawal was also effected by a note filed by our Ambassador in Warsaw with
the Polish Foreign Ministry. The text of the note is in Dep't State Press Release No.
110, 13 May 1966, reprinted at 32 J. Air L. & Com. 247 (1966).
17 A thorough study of the history of the U. S. relationship to the Warsaw Conven-
tion and of its efforts to improve the liability limit leading to the 1966 inter-airline
agreement, is in Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, the United States and the Warsaw
Convention, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 497-602 (1967). A shorter treatment through the de-
nunciation is in Kriendler, The Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. Air
L. & Com. 291 (1965) and, for events thereafter and through the withdrawal of the
denunciation, press releases of the State Department reprinted at 32 J. Air L. & Com.
243 (1966).
18 Agreement C. A. B. 18900, supra, n. 1.
19 Warsaw Convention, Article 1, supra, n. 2.
20 For a list of Warsaw adherents, see 2 CCH Av. L. Rep. § 27, 053.
21 E.g., Glenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion, S. A., 102 F. Supp. 631 (S. D. Fla.
1952) (round trip from U. S. to Cuba, a non-adherent).
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Airline ticket offices generally have authority to provide, on their
own ticket form, for connecting or return flights on another carrier.
Both the Convention 22 and the Agreement contemplate this practice.
Also, it should be noted that the scope of the Convention and of the
Agreement depend upon the points of origin, destination, or stops of a
flight, not on the nationality of the carrier 23 or of the passenger.
As to liability limit, each signatory agrees to $75,000 including legal
fees and costs of litigation for death, wounding or other bodily injury.
For jurisdictions where separate award is made of counsel fees and
costs, the limit is $58,000. This dichotomy will have little practical sig-
nificance in the United States. Counsel fees are not awarded separately
in crash cases.
The absolute nature of liability is effected by another provision of
the Agreement: the carrier may not raise, in a case of death, wounding,
or other bodily injury, its Warsaw defense that it has taken all neces-
sary measures to avoid the accident or that it was impossible to do so.
Nothing within the Agreement, however, is to affect the rights and
liability of the carrier with regard to any claim brought by, or in re-
spect to any person who wilfully causes damage which results in death,
wounding or other bodily injury of, a passenger.
The Warsaw Convention allows a contributory negligence de-
fense.24 Its provision for such defense is not referred to in the Agree-
ment, and the reservation respecting the saboteur is not a limitation on
such defense. This defense would also be available against the saboteur
who is on the plane but not if the saboteur is not a passenger. It is the
latter possibility, although not exclusively, that prompted the Agree-
ment's reservation respecting sabotage.25 The reservation does not bar
claimants having no relation to the saboteur.
Each signatory further agrees, on delivery of the ticket, to furnish
to each passenger affected by the Convention, a notice in at least 10-
point type (this page is 10-point type) of the limit of the Convention and
of the higher limit of the Agreement. The notice may be (i) printed on
the ticket, (ii) on a piece of paper placed with the ticket in the ticket
envelope or attached to the ticket or (iii) on the ticket envelope.
Every signatory is also to keep at its ticket counters an up-to-date
list of all other signatories. The Convention confines liability for death
or personal injuries to the carrier performing the leg of the journey on
22 Warsaw Convention, Article 30(1), supra, n. 2.
23 E.g., Glenn v. Compania Cubana de Aviacion, S. A., supra, n. 21. Of course, only
the Convention was involved in this case.
24 Warsaw Convention, Article 21, supra, n. 2.
25 Comments of the United States of America, Panel of Experts on Limits for Passen-
gers under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, September 30, 1966
(hereinafter, Comments). This document was prepared for a meeting of the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization in January, 1967. The ICAO will publish the
documents prepared for the meeting.
May, 1967
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which the accident occurs.20c A passenger who must connect with, or
return on, another line and wishes to make one ticket arrangement cov-
ering his entire trip will be able to see if that other line subscribes to
the Agreement. Withdrawal from the Agreement is to be on twelve
months' notice to the C.A.B. and the other signatories.
Each signatory was to incorporate the Agreement into its tariffs,
effective May 16, 1966, filed with the C.A.B. or with any other gov-
ernment. The liability limitation in the Convention authorizes varia-
tion upward by agreement between the carrier and the passenger. 2T
Whether on the theory (a) that filed tariffs are incorporated in an
agreement between the carrier and the passenger as evidenced by the
ticket or (b) that the passenger is the beneficiary of an inter-line agree-
ment, it is this authorization upon which the raising to the $75,000 limit
may be founded.
Inter-airline agreements must be filed for review and approval
with the C.A.B.,2 8 and the Agreement was conditioned on such approval.
The Board approved on May 13, 1966.29 In doing so, it provided that
any carrier could become a party to the Agreement by filing a counter-
part with the Board. The signatories climbed from 28 in May, 1966 to
80 in December. s" Delta, National and United had agreed to everything
except the waiver of the Warsaw defense respecting the taking of all
possible measures. They too have now also agreed not to raise this
defense. A few carriers have not signed the Agreement but have filed
tariffs incorporating its essential provisions. If they seek some ad-
vantage by this course, it may be quicker withdrawal from the arrange-
ment.31
The time period of the Convention's application to accidents--on
board the aircraft or in any of the operations of embarking or dis-
embarking 3 2-is not changed by the Agreement.
The Agreement makes no change in the Convention's system for
baggage and cargo. For checked baggage and cargo, a conventional
declared value system is employed as to damages. Unless the shipper
declares the value and pays increased freight charges based on evalua-
tion, a limit of liability of about $7.50 per pound applies to checked
baggage and cargo.3' Liability is also presumed for checked baggage and
26 Warsaw Convention, Article 30(2), supra, n. 2.
27 Ibid., Art. 22(1), supra, n. 2.
28 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 412; 49 U. S. C. § 1382.
29 C. A. B. Order No. E-23680, 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
30 A list of carriers that have signed the Agreement may be found at 2 CCH Av. L.
Rep. § 27, 130.
31 Tariff amendments must be filed at least thirty days before their effective date.
14 C. F. R. § 221. 160(a).
32 Warsaw Convention, Article 17, supra, n. 2.
3' Ibid., Art. 22(2), supra, n. 2.
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cargo. 34 The carrier again has the defense that it took all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible to take such
measures.
35
For what the passenger carries aboard himself, the limit of liability
is approximately $330 per passenger regardless of the weight of the
items.3 6 There is no treaty presumption of liability for what the pas-
senger carries aboard. However, it is generally impossible to reconstruct
what the passenger checked or carried aboard.
As to goods and baggage, without distinguishing as to whether
they are checked or unchecked, but not as to personal injuries or
death, the Convention relieves the carrier from respondeat superior
liability for piloting or navigation errors, provided that in all other re-
spects, the carrier took all necessary measures to avoid the damage.3 7
This defense is virtually inactive.
The Agreement reverses a disparity in application that had been
a telling argument against the Convention. Suppose two passengers
are on a Cleveland to New York flight, but the ticket of one provides
for continuation on to London. Suppose further, an accident occurs
before reaching New York. The $8,300 limit of the Convention would
have bound the passenger going to London, but not the one going
only to New York.38
Now, the disparity will appear in a modified form. A passenger
flying from, say, Rome to London, involved in an accident between
those cities, will be bound by the Convention. His fellow passenger
carrying a ticket for passage to New York may assert the Agreement.
The Agreement does not protect a person flying one way from the
United States to a country that does not adhere to the Convention un-
less the ticketed stop is an airport within an adherent country, even if
the carrier has signed the Agreement. As such passage is not inter-
national transportation within the meaning of the Convention, it is not
covered by the Agreement. A few of the signers of the Agreement are
carriers of nations that do not adhere to the Convention. Their signing
does not bring their country within the Warsaw system. A one-way
non-stop ticket between the United States and their home country
would not be covered by the Agreement.
Nor, obviously, does the Agreement protect a passenger on a carrier
that is not a signatory even if the flight is within the scope of the Con-
vention and the Agreement. The number of non-signers should decline.
The fact that each signatory to the Agreement has a list of all other
34 Id., Art. 18(1), supra, n. 2.
35 Id., Art. 20(1), supra, n. 2.
36 Id., Art. 22 (3), supra, n. 3.
37 Id., Art. 20 (2), supra, n. 2.
38 E.g., Winsor v. United Air Lines, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 244 (E. D. N. Y. 1957).
May, 1967
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signatories will induce signing to secure inter-line business. Also, the
carriers are required to keep a poster notice on their ticket counters to
the effect that the Warsaw Convention, and its limit of liability, may
apply to a passenger's projected trip.39 The C.A.B. is considering a dif-
ferent counter notice for the carriers that have signed.40 Finally, on
applications for renewal of foreign air carrier permits, the Board
Counsel is taking the position that renewal be conditioned on signing
the Agreement.
Americans travelling between two foreign countries on a ticket that
does not include a point in the United States as origin, destination, or
stopping place are not protected by the Agreement. Their flight may
be subject to the Convention, if ticketed within its scope, to the Hague
Protocol if between two adherents to that amendment of the Conven-
tion, or to neither.
Ironically, the passenger on a flight not covered by the Convention,
the Hague Protocol, or the Agreement, may be the best protected. Suffi-
cient contacts with a state with no limitation of liability may exist to
permit enforcement of that state's cause as opposed to a possible limited
cause of the locale of the accident. Many foreign causes incorporate the
Warsaw and Hague limits and their presumption of liability.4 1 For-
saking such a foreign cause for one of a U. S. state entails forsaking the
presumption. But if plaintiff can present no explanation of the accident,
he can fall back on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur which affords an in-
ference of negligence that would at least get him to the jury.4 2
However, if the cause settled upon by the significant contacts ap-
proach is itself limited, the limit may not give way to a policy of the
forum against enforcing limitations. The federal courts have held that
New York's policy against limits43 will not give way to the limit of the
appropriate foreign cause in a death action brought by non-residents
44
or in a personal injury action brought even by a New Yorker.45 In a
39 14 C. F. R. § 221. 175.
40 31 Fed. Reg. 12573.
41 Tables summarizing the principles of foreign causes are in International Civil
Aviation Organization, Special ICAO Meeting on Limits for Passengers under the
Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, Vol. II-Documents, at pp. 29-50 (1966).
ICAO Doc. No. 8584-LC/154-2.
42 Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, the United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 497, 521-2 (1967). However, defendants have fared well when plain-
tiffs have had to depend on res ipsa loquitur in air crashes. Sand, Air Carriers'
Limitation of Liability and Air Passengers' Accident Compensation under the War-
saw Convention, 28 J. Air L. & Com. 260, 262 (1962).
43 Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N. Y. 2d 34, 172 N. E. 2d 526, 211 N. Y. S. 2d
133 (1961).
44 Campbell v. Trans-World Airlines, Inc., 9 CCH Av. L. Rep. § 18, 223 (S. D. N. Y.
1965), affirmed Jan. 12, 1966 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U. S. 824 (1966) (Limit of
New Mexico death statute enforced against non-residents of New York).
45 Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro do sul, S. A., 359 F. 2d 855 (2d Cir. 1966),
affirming 245 F. Supp. 819 (S. D. N. Y. 1965). (Brazilian limit enforced against New
Yorker on business flight within Brazil.)
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death action by a New Yorker his domicile and the interest of New York
in the administration of his estate would be strong factors in inducing
selection of New York's unlimited cause in the first place. 40
The passenger on a flight governed by the Convention or the Pro-
tocol, but not the Agreement, would be better protected had we not
withdrawn our denunciation of the Convention. Although varied in
many of its applications by the Agreement, it remains, as a treaty to
which we adhere, part of the supreme law of the land. Its limits take
precedence over state damage rules or policies. Constitutional attacks
on the Convention's limit as a deprivation of property without due
process, 47 as a denial of the right to jury trial4s and as in excess of the
treaty making power 49 have been tried without success.50
As to causes governed by the Agreement, the C.A.B. calculates that
its $75,000 limit is sufficient for 76 per cent of airline passengers or their
representatives. 51 To establish absolute liability, the pleading would
have to allege:
a. that the airport locations on the ticket invoke the Convention;
b. that one of the locations-of starting point, destination or
stopping place-is within the United States; and
c. that an accident occurred within flight or in the course of em-
barking or disembarking.
Writing in the ABA Journal,52 Milton G. Sincoff, a member of a
firm that has been prominent in the development of air crash injury
law, then recommends a motion for summary judgment on the sole issue
of liability, where available under local practice, leaving only the
issue of damages for trial. Where damages are greater than $75,000,
Mr. Sincoff recommends a second cause of action alleging wilful mis-
conduct. The ensuing procedure would again be a motion for summary
46 Long v. Pan American World Airways, 16 N. Y. 2d 337, 213 N. E. 2d 796, 266
N. Y. S. 2d 513 (1965). In Long, a plane disintegrated over the Delaware-Maryland
border. The wreckage fell in Maryland. Plaintiffs' decedents had been Pennsylvan.-
ians. New York, as an impartial forum, enforced Pennsylvania's causes as opposed to
Maryland's.
47 Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways, 58 F. Supp.
338 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
48 Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, 152 F. Supp. 486 (D. C. N. J. 1957).
49 Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways, supra, n. 47.
50 A broad constitutional attack on the Convention on all of these grounds was at-
tempted in nine cases in 1964. But plaintiffs' vehicle was wrong, and the merits
were never reached. Plaintiffs moved for the convening of a three-judge court
pursuant to 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282 and 2284 to enjoin enforcement of the Convention,
which had been or would have been raised in these cases as an affirmative defense.
The court ruled that their petitions were lacking in equity and that the Convention,
as a treaty, did not fit within the term "statute" in 28 U. S. C. §§ 2282 and 2284. Boryk
v. Aerolineas Argentinas (and eight other cases), Civil Jury Nos. 64-2718 to 64-2726,
S. D. N. Y., Sept. 29, 1964, 9 CCH Av. L. Rep. § 17, 273.
51 Comments, supra, n. 25.
52 Sincoff, Absolute Liability and Increased Damages in International Aviation Acci-
dents, 52 A. B. A. J. 1122 (1966).
May, 1967
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judgment on the first cause relating to absolute liability followed by a
trial on damages. If the verdict is in excess of $75,000, that sum would
be collected to, in effect, finance a subsequent trial to prove wilful mis-
conduct. Success of this second trial would enable entry of judgment,
subject to a credit for whatever has been paid, for the full verdict from
the damage trial. Finally, Mr. Sincoff recommends a cause predicated
on the carrier's failure to give effective notice of the limits on its li-
ability.
Surgical Therapy
The Convention requires that notice of its liability terms be placed
on the ticket53 and that a carrier may not accept a passenger without a
ticket having been delivered.54 Failure to comply with either of these
provisions entails loss to the carrier of the Convention's provisions
limiting or excluding liability.55 The ticket must be delivered in suffi-
cient time to give the passenger a reasonable opportunity to protect
himself, such as by buying flight insurance or staying home.56 He might
also make a special contract with the carrier, but this is never done.
Now, Lisi says that the passenger must have actual notice of the
liability limitation and that the standard form ticket in use in interna-
tional transportation since 1957 does not give it.57 The ticket's mention
of the Convention is too small and indistinct, and too confusing, to give
notice58
Since 1963, all U. S. and foreign carriers have been required by
the C.A.B. to give, to each passenger whose flight would be covered by
the Convention and would involve departure or destination in the
United States, a notice of the Convention in one of the same ways now
permitted by the Agreement and also in 10-point type.59 The language
of this notice is similar to that dictated in the Agreement. The notice
is also to appear, in letters at least one-fourth of an inch high, on a sign
at each counter and ticket agency.60
Lisi arose out of a crash, where tickets were issued in 1960, three
years before the C.A.B. regulation for notice. However, the ticket
stock in Lisi was agreed upon by the International Air Transport As-
53 Warsaw Convention, Article 3(1), supra, n. 2.
54 Ibid., Art. 3(2), supra, n. 2.
55 Ibid. The Convention literally imposes this penalty only for failure to deliver a
ticket. Lisi, supra, n. 4, says that the penalty flows if a ticket is delivered but without
the notice.
56 Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F. 2d 851 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U. S.
816 (1965); Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F. 2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965).
57 Lisi v. Alitalia, supra, n. 4.
58 The body of the Lisi opinion discusses the size and obscurity of the notice. But a
footnote mentions its ambiguity as another ground of inadequacy.
59 14 C. F. R. § 221. 175.
60 Ibid.
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sociation and has been used to date without significant variation by all
international carriers. Indeed, not all the tickets in Lisi were issued by
the defendant. Three were issued by T.W.A. and included the fatal
Alitalia flight for a return from Rome.
It is questionable whether compliance with the alternatives offered
by the C.A.B. regulation and the Agreement, of placing the notice on a
piece of paper or on the ticket envelope, as opposed to placing it on
the ticket, would be compliance with the Convention. The separate but
accompanying notice may be deemed included in the contract with the
passenger, the term used in the article of the Convention defining its
scope. But the Convention article calling for notice specifies the ticket.
The liability limitation in the Convention authorizes variation upward
by special agreement. No authorization of variation appears in the
Convention's provision for notice on the ticket.
However, the concept of effective delivery is itself a liberal interpre-
tation of the notice provision of the Convention. The courts may be ex-
pected not to penalize a carrier merely because it has adopted an al-
ternative promulgated by the C.A.B. or sanctioned by an agreement of
which the C.A.B. has been an ardent sponsor. The Board also approved
the standard ticket form involved in Lisi,61 but its role was far more
passive. Similarly, it will be embarrassing to the C.A.B., our agency
most active in executing air carrier regulation, not to defer to its choice
of words and type size in interpreting the concept of effective delivery
under the Convention.
The notice could, however, be considerably improved. Both the
1963 C.A.B. regulation and the Agreement expressly, and the Con-
vention implicitly, call for giving of notice to those passengers affected
by these arrangements. But the prescribed language in the C.A.B.
regulation and the Agreement, probably because counter personnel can-
not be relied upon to distinguish Warsaw or Agreement flights, describe
a highly qualified and conditioned notice for indiscriminate distribu-
tion. The recipient does not know if his flight will actually be governed
by these arrangements. It should be possible
a. for the notice distinctly to say to a particular passenger that
his flight is subject to these arrangements and
b. to program a computer to absorb any arrangement of ticket
points and to advise whether a particular ticket requires giving
the specific notice to the traveller, just as ticket agents have an
instrument at their counter that advises of the reservation status
of a flight.
The C.A.B. regulation and the Agreement provoke another practical
problem in light of Lisi. Many passengers never see their tickets or do
not receive them from the airline, and they may have no occasion to
01 24 C. A. B. 575 (1957).
May, 1967
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see the counter notice. Husbands buy, hold and present tickets for their
families. Secretaries buy tickets for their employers. The record in
Lisi includes an affidavit by a claimant who was 18 at the time of the
accident to the effect that he never saw the tickets; his mother had them.
Also, the airlines accommodate latecomers and hold tickets until flight
time for passengers who have reserved well in advance.
A similar problem arose twenty years ago in the Froman case. Miss
Froman was injured on a U.S.O. tour. A tour manager handled all
flight arrangements and ticket purchases. The Convention's notice pro-
vision is phrased ambiguously: "if the carrier accepts a passenger with-
out a passenger ticket [with the notice on it] having been delivered.
• .,2 To Miss Froman's contention that she personally had not been
delivered a ticket and that she should not be bound by the Conven-
tion's limits, the court was able to say that the Convention does not
require physical delivery of the ticket into the passenger's own hand. 3
It is more difficult to say that the ticket and notice must not go to
each passenger under the C.A.B. regulation and the Agreement. Both
say that the carrier shall, "at the time of delivery of the ticket," "furnish
[the notice] to each passenger." The carriers will have difficulty securing
the cooperation of the passengers in compliance with these requirements.
Indeed, in the Froman case, the court observed that it would ill serve
the objects of the treaty to insist that the recipient of the ticket with
its notice in every case be the passenger. 4
For cases arising before 1963, Lisi answers many of these practical
problems. The notice on the standard form international ticket is too
small and too lacking in distinction to sustain effective delivery no matter
who gets the ticket or when. But for post-1963 tickets, if concepts of
agency or constructive receipt of the C.A.B. or Agreement notice are
introduced to reconcile common practices with the language of these
documents, they conflict with Lisi's interpretation of the treaty as re-
quiring actual notice.
Where will the burden of pleading and proof be as to notice? In
Lisi, the carrier pleaded the $8,300 limit as a partial affirmative defense
and that it has taken all necessary measures to avoid the accident, or
such were impossible to take, as a complete affirmative defense. The
notice issue arose on plaintiffs' motion to strike the defense. This
suggests that it is for defendant to establish notice as a condition upon
its assertion of defenses and not for plaintiff to plead and prove a breach
of duty of defendant to give notice. That the Agreement changes the
number in the Convention should not vary this allocation. Plaintiff will
62 Warsaw Convention, Article 3 (2), supra, n. 2.
63 Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N. Y. 88, 95, 85 N. E. 2d 880, 884 (1949),
cert. denied, 349 U. S. 947(1955).
64 Id. at 98, 85 N. E. 2d at 885-6.
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1967
16 CLEV-MAR. L. R. (2)
be opting for defendant's inability to assert any limit. This allocation
fairly reflects the ease of furnishing proof, particularly on the death of
a passenger. It is consistent with the analysis in the Froman case:
that there must be a delivery of a ticket is thus a condition set up
by the Convention itself, as a determinant of the applicability, or
no, of the Convention's limited liability rules. 5
It is consistent also with the phrasing of the Convention's penalty for
failure to give notice:
Nevertheless, if the carrier accepts a passenger without a passenger
ticket having been delivered he shall not be entitled to avail him-
self of those provisions of this Convention which exclude or limit
his liability.6"
Prognosis Guarded
The Administration considers the Agreement only an interim one.
It believes that empirical data and experience are yet needed to de-
velop a resolution of the interests of the carriers, passengers and the
courts. For example, the airlines have maintained that absolute li-
ability, rather than being conducive to settlement, will increase the
number of small or fraudulent claims or protract litigation. They reason
that with the issue of liability secure to the claimant, he will be more
obstinate in settling damages.
Also, the insurance burden on the industry, another of their argu-
ments, cannot yet be calculated. The C.A.B. queried 60 U. S. carriers on
changes in insurance costs because of the agreement. 7 The information
returned is inconclusive. Rates for many carriers are adjusted retro-
spectively only. Where rates have been finally readjusted, the increases
have greatly varied. There is some relationship to the volume of inter-
national business. Local service routes operating wholly within the
United States and carrying few international passengers have been little
troubled. At the other extreme, carriers whose passenger operations
are primarily international charters, such as the lines who help carry
the large number of summer tourists to Europe, have experienced high
rate increases. But for the major U. S. and foreign carriers, it is too
soon to calculate increases in rates and percentages of operating cost.
A few and admittedly inadequate phone calls to air crash specialty
firms in New York City indicate that there will be little or no con-
cession in contingencies for handling crash cases. A smaller slice of
recoveries for legal fees is another object of the government. Damages
must still be proved and it is expected that executors of estates will in-
sist on crashing the $75,000 barrier. But cases arising out of the first
crash under the Agreement are only starting.
65 Id. at 97, 85 N. E. 2d at 885.
66 Warsaw Convention, Article 3(2), supra, n. 2.
67 Comments, supra, n. 25.
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Subject to the empirical data, the government is open to a range of
possibilities including: 68
a. elimination of all limits,
b. limits higher than $75,000,
c. limits lower than $75,000, but with absolute liability and a relaxa-
tion of the test of wilful misconduct,
d. passenger selection of the limit, with the ticket price varying
with the choice.
Whatever the formula, the United States hopes not to depend on inter-
airline agreement and will work for resolution in international treaty.
68 Id.
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